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Many developing countries are unable to provide their 
industrial sector with reliable power and many enterprises 
have to contend with electricity that is insufficient and 
of poor quality. Because of these constraints, firms in 
developing countries opt for self-generation even though 
it is widely considered a second best solution. This paper 
develops a theoretical model of investment behavior 
in remedial infrastructure when physical and credit 
constraints are present. It then tests econometrically 
some implications from this model using a large sample 
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of enterprises from 87 countries from the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey Database. After showing that these 
constraints interact and have non-linear effects depending 
on the industrial sector’s degree of reliance on electricity 
and size of firms, the paper draws differentiated policy 
recommendations. Credit constraints appear to be the 
priority in sectors very reliant on electricity to spur entry 
and convergence to the technological frontier, while in 
other sectors, firms would benefit more widely from 
marginal improvements in electrical supply.Firms Operating under Infrastructure and Credit 
Constraints in Developing Countries. 
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Many developing countries are unable to provide their industrial sector with reliable power 
and many enterprises have to contend with electricity that is insufficient and of poor quality. 
Because  of  these  constraints,  firms  in  developing  countries  opt  for  self-generation  even 
though it is widely considered a second best solution.  This paper develops a theoretical 
model of investment behavior in remedial infrastructure when physical and credit constraints 
are present. It then tests econometrically some implications from this model using a large 
sample of enterprises from 87 countries from the World Bank Enterprise Survey Database. 
After showing that these constraints interact and have non-linear effects depending on the 
industrial  sector’s  degree  of  reliance  on  electricity  and  size  of  firms,  the  paper  draws 
differentiated policy recommendations. Credit constraints appear to be the priority in sectors 
very reliant on electricity to spur entry and convergence to the technological frontier, while 
in other sectors, firms would benefit more widely from marginal improvements in electrical 
supply. 
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1. Introduction 
There  is  growing  evidence,  both  micro-  and  macroeconomic,  that  better  electricity 
infrastructure significantly boosts economic growth and improves a range of development 
outcomes.
4 Energy is necessary for the operation of productive capital in the industrial sector. 
Low levels of infrastructure development and poor quality of services can drive up firms’ 
direct and indirect costs and bias their technological choices away from energy-intensive ones 
which, in turn, increase the overall costs relative to competitors in other regions.
5 Enterprises 
typically face more b arriers in developing countries  where firms have difficulties getting 
connected to the grid from public utilities.
6 When firms do get connected, the sanctioned load 
is often lower than their demand and they face frequent scheduled and unscheduled power 
cuts. In addition, fluctuations in voltage and frequency of power supplied causes machine 
damage, material losses, and variations in product quality.  As a result, production volumes, 
manufacturing costs and output quality are all adversely affected; firms invest less or in less 
efficient technologies and have lower productivity growth. 
To offset these negative impacts, industrial firms in developing countries are often 
opting for self-generation even though it is widely considered a second best solution. Of the 
25 Sub-Saharan countries reviewed by Foster and Steinbucks (2009), in -house generation 
accounts for more than 25% of the installed generating capacity in 3 countries, and for more 
than 10% in 9 others. This of course has a negative impact on their overall investment 
capacity:  In  Nigeria,  where  40%  of  electricity  consumed  is  produced  through  auto -
generation, firms spend up to 20 –30%  of  initial  investment  on  measures  to  enhance  the 
reliability of electricity supply.
7 It also drives up costs: Foster and Steinbucks (2009) estimate 
that in Africa, own-generated electricity is on average 313% more expensive th an that from 
the grid. In environments with important credit constraints, such investments in mitigating 
                                                           
4  See  for  example  Calderón  and  Servén  (2003),  and  Calderón  (2009)  for  cross-country  estimations,  and 
Dinkelman (2009) and Lipscomb, Mobarak and Barham (2009) for microeconomic evidence. 
5 Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran (2008). 
6 World Bank (2005); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004). 
7 Adenikinju (2005). technologies are often inaccessible to smaller firms or those more severely exposed to credit 
restrictions.  Infrastructure  failures  and  credit  limitations  therefore  interact  in  constraining 
firms’  development,  both  by  making  existing  investments  less  productive  and  by 
discouraging new ones. 
In this paper, we use a sample of 46,606 firms across 87 countries covering the period 
2002-2006  to  analyze  the  behavior  of  firms  facing  both  infrastructure  and  financing 
constraints. In particular, our objective is to understand under which conditions they decide to 
invest  in  their  own  generating  capacity,  and  how  this  decision  is  affected  by  the  above 
mentioned constraints and their interactions with firm- and sector-level characteristics. The 
answers  to  these  questions  are  important  because  they  condition  the  policies  towards 
industrial development and, in particular, the way policy makers in different environments 
should prioritize measures related to credit limitations versus those addressing investment in 
infrastructure. 
A number of papers have documented the burden imposed on developing countries’ firms 
by an erratic, low quality supply of electricity. Early contributions include Lee, Anas and Oh 
(1996) and Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray (1996)—both of which use data from Nigeria, 
Indonesia and Thailand.  Lee, Anas and Oh (1996) document the extent and incidence of 
public  infrastructure  deficiencies,  the  response  of  private  entrepreneurs  in  terms  of 
investment in private infrastructure and the private cost of generation. They conclude that the 
private  costs  of  infrastructure  deficiencies  are  substantial  and  that  the  burdens  fall 
disproportionately on smaller firms, while pointing out large differences across these three 
countries, linked in particular to the regulatory environment.  In Indonesia and Thailand, the 
opening  up  of  infrastructure  markets  to  private  providers  and  the  possibility  of  shared 
production appears to ease constraints on all categories of firms and to improve the reliability 
of service flows.   
Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray (1996) develop a model of the firm in which electricity is 
produced internally, with scale economies to explain why firms supplement their purchases 
of  publicly  produced  electricity  with  electricity  produced  internally  (a  practice  that  is 
prevalent in Nigeria, common in Indonesia, but rare in Thailand). The paper confirms strong 
scale economies in internal power production in both Nigeria and Indonesia and establishes 
that in both countries, smaller firms would be ready to pay higher prices for reliable public power than larger firms.  It  therefore  concludes that instead of  giving  quantity discounts, 
public monopolies could reallocate scarce resources by charging the larger firms more and 
the smaller firms less than they presently do. In Nigeria, the large firms would make intensive 
use of their idle generating capacity, while in Indonesia they would expand their facilities. In 
both countries, small users would realize savings by having to rely less on an expensive 
power generator. 
Hallward-Driemeier  and  Stewart  (2004)  document  patterns  of  access  to  infrastructure 
services by enterprises in developing countries and show that access varies by infrastructure 
service  and firm  size—with  electricity often being the biggest  problem, and larger  firms 
expressing  more  concerns  than  smaller  firms  about  all  services.  They  report  that  the 
overwhelming majority of firms in poor countries is affected by electrical outages, leading to 
losses sometimes exceeding 10% of sales.  In Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, 
improvements  in  the  reliability  of  the  power  supply  is  found  to  increase  garment 
manufacturers’ total factor productivity and the growth rates of their output and employment 
(Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae, 2005). Gulyani (1999) documents the impact of 
electricity hazards on an Indian car manufacturer and its upstream suppliers, which have 
devised an innovative generation and power-sharing system to solve their power problems. 
Gulyani argues that self-generation is economical and, combined with power sharing, can 
serve as a model that could be replicated to ameliorate the power problems plaguing large 
manufacturing firms in developing countries. 
Closest  to  our  paper  are  contributions  by  Reinikka  and  Svensson  (2002)  and,  more 
recently, by Foster and Steinbucks (2009) and Steinbucks (2008). Reinikka and Svensson 
analyze a sample of 171 Ugandan firms, some of which responded to poor electricity supply 
by  investing  in  generators.  They  show  that  this  came  at  the  cost  of  reducing  overall 
investment  and  installing  less  productive  capital.  After  providing  very  rich  descriptive 
statistics on in-house electricity generation in 25 Sub-Saharan African countries, Foster and 
Steinbucks  (2009) estimate that the weighted  average costs of power  own-generation for 
large firms remains relatively small and that the main victims are both existing informal firms 
and the formal ones that were not created as a results of the prevailing constraints. They also 
allude to the potential benefit of allowing firms with generation capacity to resell power into 
the national grid. Steinbucks (2008) uses firm-level data from Sub-Saharan African countries and  concludes  that  firms  experiencing  fewer  credit  constraints  are  more  likely  to  own  a 
private generator in the areas where public power supply is unreliable. 
Our original contribution  is  to  document systematically the  effects  of both  electricity 
deficiencies and credit constraints on the decision to invest in mitigating technology, i.e., a 
generator, and to analyze how their impact varies across firm types (in particular, size) and 
technological characteristics of the industrial sector they belong to. The use of a theoretical 
model of firms’ responses to power outages allows us to derive precise predictions that are 
borne out by the data. Using a dataset with a wide coverage across 87 countries and 28 two-
digit (ISIC) industry classifications, we show that electricity-related constraints have non-
linear effects and that they also interact with credit constraints. Moreover, the marginal and 
threshold effects vary according to sectors’ degree of reliance on electricity and firms’ size. 
Finally, we discuss potential policy implications from our results. Credit constraints appear to 
be the priority in sectors very reliant on electricity to spur entry and convergence to the 
technological frontier, while in other sectors, firms would benefit more widely from marginal 
improvements in electrical supply. We discuss how the power-sharing versus pricing policies 
issues highlighted above may be used to address these implications. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our dataset and provides descriptive 
statistics on the extent of electricity deficiencies and credit constraints, as they emerge from 
the enterprise surveys. In Section 3, we then develop a model of investment by firms when 
infrastructure  and  credit  constraints  are  present.  Section  4  spells  out  the  econometric 
specifications to be estimated with our data. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
discusses the policy implications and concludes. 
2. Data and Stylized Facts 
We use data from the enterprise surveys for 104 countries covered a total of 70,192 firms 
over the period 2002-2006.
8  Of these, 87 countries have data on number of power outages, 77 
countries have data on generator and 34 countries have data on cost of electricity.
9 Table 1 
presents general summary statistics, and Table 2 break these down by generator ownership.  
                                                           
8 See https://www.enterprisesurveys.org.  Unfortunately it is not possible to use the available 2006-09 data for 
such an exercise since key questions about power were dropped from the questionnaire. 
9 This results in a sample of 62 countries with data on generator and number of power outages, and 32 countries 
with data on generator, number of power outages and cost of electricity.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics for all Firms 
   Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  S.D  Observations 
Number of workers  138.83  22  0  67,598  715.00  70,192 
Age of firm  17.27  11  0  261  16.99  69,602 
Profit (PPP basis)  2.12e+08  394,000  -4.51e+12  3.70e+12  3.92e+10  22,640 
Number of power outage per year  27.57  3  0  7,355  91.08  46,606 
Generator Ownership (% of firms with a generator)  31.05  0  0  100  46.27  43,646 
Cost of electricity (% total costs)  6.87  3  0  100  13.63  14,256 
Investment (PPP basis)  4.75e+07  631.579  -635250  5.92e+11  3.72e+09  41,471 
Investment less potential costs of generator (PPP basis)  2.98e+07  6.26  -9.69e+07  2.87e+11  2.40e+09  29,639 
% of firms’ working capital financed through internal funds  60.73  70  0  100  39.99  66,229 
% of firms fully financed through internal funds  38.66  0  0  100  48.70  66,229 
% of firms quoting access to finance as severe or major constraint  20.75  0  0  100  40.55  66,811 
% of firms quoting electricity as severe or major constraint  15.62  0  0  100  36.31  68,694 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics by ownership of generator 
   Owns a generator     Does not own generator 
   Mean  Median     Mean  Median 
Number of workers   258.40  55    118.97  21 
Age of firm  20.56  15    17.17  12 
Profit (PPP basis)  7.73e+08  2.6e+06    7.99e+07  591,166 
Number of power outages per year  68.84  12    25.89  5 
Percent of Electricity coming from generator  21.35  10.00     -  - 
Number of firms  13,553    30,093 
 
Firms with installed generators are typically larger and report more days without power from 
the public grid during the survey year. Moreover, such firms are slightly older. 
Many  developing  countries  are  unable  to  provide  their  industrial  sector  with  reliable 
electric power and industrial enterprises have to contend with electricity that is insufficient 
and of poor quality.  
Table  3  shows  the  severity  of  electricity  hazards  across  regions  and  country  income 
groups. Column 1 reports a subjective indicator: the percentage of firms’ managers quoting 
electricity  as  major  or  severe  constraint  to  their  operations  and  growth.  Electricity  is 
perceived as a ―major‖ or ―very severe‖ constraint for 15% of the entrepreneurs (and for 
more than 26% of firms located in low-income countries).  The highest percentage of firms 
considering electricity as a serious problem is in South Asia (43% of firms) followed by East 
Asia, and Africa.  Columns 2 and 3 report objective indicators: the average number of power 
outages suffered by firms in a given group of countries, and the fraction of them having 
suffered more than 30 outages in the last year. Overall, firms face period without electricity 
from the public grid on average 28 times per year but this can be as high as 132 in South Asia and 61 in Africa. In these two regions, close to half of all the firms surveyed experienced 
more than 30 outages a year.  
Table 3:  Access to electricity by firms across regions and country income groups 
Region  Percent of firms 
mentioning 
electricity as 
major or severe 
constraint 
Average  
number of  
power 
outages 
Percent of firms 






Europe/Central Asia  8.5%  9.72  5.7%  27.5% 
Latin America  9.3%  12.44  7.7%  21.2% 
East Asia & Pacific  25.1%  36,49  18.3%  28.7% 
Mid. East/North Africa  21.5%  41.32  22.1%  32.4% 
Sub Saharan Africa  16.4%  61.12  45.2%  36.6% 
South Asia  43.0%  131.74  49.0%  61.7% 
Country Income Level   
High  4.9%  1.32  0.2%  - 
upper-middle  8.3%  13.02  6.2%  28.0% 
lower-middle  14.3%  13.76  9.1%  24.1% 
Low  26.4%  64.08  34.1%  42.4% 
Average  15.6%  27.57  15.2%  31.1% 
 
Table 4: Generator ownership and frequency of outages by firm characteristics 
      % of firms owning a 
generator 
Number of power outage 
         With a Generator  Without a Generator  Whole Sample 
By firm size  Number of firms  65 597  11 164  26 459  37 623 
  Small  17.4%  55.7  24.7  30.2 
  Medium  29.2%  55.8  20.0  31.6 
  Large  46.2%  67.4  17.7  43.6 
            
By firm ownership  Number of firms  70 246  13 388  29 354  42 742 
  Domestic  30.2%  73.3  27.4  43.1 
  Foreign  39.8%  44.0  17.1  29.0 
            
By firm exporting status  Number of firms  70 350  13 115  29 294  42 409 
  Exporter  44.1%  62.9  19.4  40.2 
  Non-Export  27.1%  69.8  27.9  40.7 
            
By firm location  Number of firms  54 869  10 516  20 920  31 436 
  Capital City  35.3%  91.5  35.1  55.9 
   No Capital City  32.6%  71.9  25.0  40.8 
 * Small firms have strictly less than 20 employees, medium firms employ between 20 and 99 workers and large firms have more than 100 
employees. 
The three measures provide a consistent picture both across regions and income groups: 
constraints are more stringent in South Asian, African, Middle-Eastern/North African, and 
East Asian countries—in that order, and in poorer countries. As a result, many firms invest in 
a back-up power generator: across countries, 31% of them own one. This peaks to 62% and 
37% in South Asia and Africa respectively. Looking now at firms’ characteristics, Table 4 shows that firms that are large (in terms of 
number of employees, with similar conclusions if considering sales, investment, or capital), 
foreign-owned, exporting, and based in the capital-city report owning a generator more often. 
Finally,  Table  5  provides  information  on  access  by  firms  to  the  credit  market. 
Interestingly, most ―objective‖ measures of credit constraints indicate that small firms are 
suffering more than their larger counterparts, while perceived constraints are more stringent 
for medium firms. When disaggregating by generator ownership and perception of electricity 
constraints,  respectively,  firms  without  generator  and  firms  suffering  from  electricity 
constraints appear to be more concerned with access and cost of finance. 
Table 5: Credit constraints by firm characteristics 
  
% of firms quoting 
Access to finance as 
severe or major 
constraint 
% of firms quoting 
Cost of finance as 
severe or major 
constraint 








% of firms with 




% of firms with 




By firm size             
Small  19,3%  31,4%  68,4%  54,2%  47,4%  44,6% 
Medium  22,7%  36,3%  58,2%  50,8%  35,2%  38,1% 
Large  19,9%  31,2%  53,4%  49,8%  30,3%  35,2% 
By generator ownership             
With generator  23.3%  35.1%  53.5%  50.7%  30.0%  37.0% 
Without generator  26.2%  40.4%  56.1%  44.2%  35.4%  34.0% 
By perceived severity of electricity constraint 
Major or severe  40.1%  47.4%  59.1%  57.5%  37.5%  42.3% 
Mild  17.1%  28.5%  62.6%  52.1%  39.8%  40.3% 
TOTAL  20,7%  32,3%  60,7%  51,7%  38,7%  39,7% 
 
The  next  section  develops  a  theoretical  model  of  firm-level  investment  in  remedial 
infrastructure in the presence of electricity and credit constraints. 
 
3. The Model 
We consider a continuous moral hazard investment model à la Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997). Entrepreneurs are endowed with assets A, which can be for example cash or some 
productive assets they can pledge as collateral, distributed over a range [0,AH]. To undertake 
a productive project of variable size I, they intend to borrow an amount I − A. This project 
yields RI in case of success and 0 in case of failure, an outcome that is fully verifiable. 
However, the probability of success depends on the effort exerted by entrepreneurs, which is 
not observable by the lender. If the entrepreneur works, the probability of success is pH, while if he shirks, it is only pL < pH, but he enjoys a private benefit BI or equivalently saves on the 
cost of effort. 
To be socially valuable, it must be the case that the net present value (NPV) per unit of 
investment is positive if effort is exerted (pHR > 1) and negative if not (pLR +B < 1). The 
credit contract then consists in an amount I and shares corresponding to the borrower (Rb) and 
the lender (Rl ), such that  RI = Rb + Rl.  The incentive constraint of the borrower is given by: 
pHRb ≥ pLRb + BI     Rb ≥BI/Δp,         (1) 
and this defines the maximum income pledgeable to the lender Rl = RI – BI/Δp. Moreover, 
the lender must at least break even, which implies that: 
pHRl ≥ I − A.              (2) 
The problem is solved by assuming that the credit market is competitive, so profits are 
null and (2) is binding. After straightforward computations, we can characterize the level of 
investment: 
I ≤ kA,               (3) 
where  k  =  1/[1+(pHB/Δp)−pHR].  In  a  competitive  credit  market,  borrowers  get  all  the 
surplus,  which  can  be  written  as  Ub(A)  =  (pHR−1)I  =  (pHR−1)kA,  and  they  invest  the 
maximum possible amount (I = kA).
10 
 
Introducing Infrastructure Constraints 
Consider now that the net return R to the project also depends on a complementary input, 
in this case electricity from the grid, the provision of which might be of varying quality.  For 
simplicity,  we  assume  that  R  =  ʴr,  where  r  is  the  gross  return  absent  any  infrastructure 
constraint, and ʴ  [0, 1] is the efficiency of electric supply. This parameter may capture both 
the quality of electric supply, such as  the number of outages  affecting the firm,  and the 
sensitivity  of  the  project  to  electricity  supply,  which  is  likely  to  depend  on  sectoral 
                                                           
10  Assumptions (1) and (2) imply that k > 1. We also need to assume that pHR < 1 + pHB/Δp to ensure that the 
optimal size of the firm is not infinite. 
 characteristics such as the degree to which a specific productive process relies on electricity 
as an input.  
The first question is whether the project is still worth undertaking. If pHδr < 1, the 
unit NPV is too low and production simply does not occur. This defines a threshold value of 
δ, denoted δ0 ≡ 1/pHr, under which entry will not happen. The quality of supply and the 
sector-level  sensitivity  interact  to  determine  the  actual  value  of  δ.  In  particular,  when 
operating at the technological frontier, some sectors are naturally more reliant on electricity 
than others. Define Si as the sector-level benchmark electricity intensity, such that a sector 
with a higher ―sensitivity to electricity‖ have a higher Si. The model’s assumption is that the 
higher Si, the lower the number of power outages N such that δ < δ0. 
As long as pHδr > 1, the problem is solved as above and entrepreneurs invest I ≤ k
δA, where: 
k
δ = 1 / [1 + (pHB/Δp) − pHδr].         (4) 
Their final utility is given by: 
Ub (A) = (pHδr − 1) k
δA.           (5) 
Alternatively, when the cost of infrastructure deficiencies is too high, the firm can obtain a 
higher return by investing in private substitutes capital goods, for example a diesel generator 
in the case of electricity. This investment has a cost κ, leaving the firm with an initial capital 
A − κ, but the firm then ensures a return R
G, such that δr < R
G
 < r. In that case, the firm 
proceeds to invest I
G = k
G(A − κ), where: 
k
G = 1 / [1 + pHB/Δp − pHR
G].        (6) 
The firm gets utility: 
U
G
b (A) = (pHR
G – 1) k
G(A − κ).         (7) 
 
Optimal Firm Decision 
Let us now compare the benefits from investing or not in a generator at different 
levels of wealth A. It is straightforward to see that k
G > k
δ.  From the expressions of Ub (A) 
and U
G
b (A), we can draw figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 represents the case in which δ < δ0. In this parameter space, we obtain a stark 
outcome: firms above a cutoff level AL invest in complementary capital, take credit and enter 
production, while firms below the cutoff are credit constrained, as infrastructure deficiencies 
are so stringent that the return from production is too low to access the credit market, and 
they lack the capacity to invest in a generator. Notably, AL does not depend on δ as long as δ 
<  δ0.  Although  this  is  not  modeled  formally  here,  one  can  imagine  that  these  potential 
entrepreneurs remain in the informal sector and consume their own endowments.  
Figure  2  represents  the  case  in  which  δ  >  δ0.  In  that  case,  two  types  of  investment 
behavior coexist. Below the cutoff level A*, firms do not invest in generators but are still able 
to  obtain  credit  and  enter  production,  while  above  the  threshold  large  firms  invest  in 
generators and obtain a higher leverage in the credit market. When power from the grid is 
more reliable, entry to the productive sector becomes profitable across the range of potential 
entrepreneurs and sectors. Again a duality exists in terms of access to remedial investments 
and therefore productivity, but in contrast to the previous case, A* is increasing in δ, meaning 
that  as  long  as  δ  >  δ0,  an  increase  in  power  cuts  will  trigger  additional  investments  in 
generators. 
The following proposition summarizes the main results so far.
11 
Proposition 1  
1.  There is a threshold δ0 such that A*/δ > 0 if and only if δ > δ0, while for δ < δ0, 
A*/δ = 0.  
2.  The number of power outages Nj such that δ < δ0 is decreasing in Si, the benchmark 
electricity intensity of the sector: Nj/Si < 0. 
 
                                                           
11 Most proofs are straightforward and are therefore omitted. An appendix with the formal derivation of the 
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 Proposition 1 first states that the propensity to own a generator increases in the number of 
outages until these reach an upper threshold (above which δ < δ0), above which there is no 
effect as investment is discouraged altogether. The second item establishes that this threshold 
is lower in sectors naturally reliant on electricity, so entry is discouraged more easily. 
The following corollary derives implications in terms of firm size: 
Corollary 1       For small firms (A < AL), changes in the number of power outages have no 
effect on the level of initial assets A* above which the firm finds it profitable to invest in a  
generator.  This  effect  is  negative  for  larger  firms  (A  >  AL)  and  the  marginal  effect  is 
increasing in Si, the benchmark electricity intensity of the sector.  
Corollary 1 states  that  the two extremes of firms’ size distribution are unaffected by 
outages: firms smaller than AL always lack the capacity to invest in a generator, while very 
large ones systematically do so. It is in the range of mid-size firms that growing electricity 
problems induce additional investments in generators.  
Finally,  the  trade-offs  above  are  also  affected  by  the  effect  of  credit  constraints. 
Environments plagued by more moral hazard will have less well functioning credit markets. 
A simple way to characterize this in the model is to consider variations in B, which is the 
private benefit to shirking borrowers.
12 Looking at the effect of variations in B on the cutoff 
level A*, it appears that dysfunctional credit markets bite harder in environments with strong 
infrastructure constraints, in the sense that their marginal effect on the asset threshold above 
which firms are able to access substitute capital goods is stronger in that context. 
 
Proposition 2 The minimum level of initial assets A* above which the firm finds it profitable 
to invest in a generator is increasing in the extent of financial constraints, and this effect is 
stronger for δ < δ0, i.e., A*/B > 0, and A*/B¦ δ < δ0 > A*/B¦ δ > δ0. 
Proposition 2 states that credit constraints are an important limitation on firms’ ability to 
escape from electricity problems. As access to  credit worsens, a range of mid-size firms 
(those just above AL) are prevented from investing in generators. Unsurprisingly, this is more 
                                                           
12 Alternatively, one could consider that lenders recoup only a fraction of their loan, for example because of 
failures in the justice system, as in Straub (2005), and let this parameter vary. Qualitative results would be 
similar. acute at high levels of electricity deficiencies. This can be seen easily in Figure 1: as Ub
G 
shifts to the right (maintaining the origin fixed), AL goes up and the area in which firms are 
unable to enter production expands to the right. On the other hand in Figure 2, i.e., for δ > δ0, 
this effect is dampened by the fact that Ub also shifts to the right, so the net effect is smaller. 
Proposition 2 also implies that the effect of credit constraints is more pronounced in sectors 
naturally reliant on electricity, in the sense that their marginal effect increases faster and at a 
lower level of outages. 
 
4. Econometric Specifications 
The  model  specified  above  allows  us  to  test  the  following  empirical  specification 
regarding the decision to invest in an electric generator, which we can write as a binary 
decision problem: 
Genijc = 1[Gen*= θj + θc + θt + ʱ1δijc + ʱ2δijc
2 + ʱ3Fijc + ʱ4Fijc*δijc + Xijc γ + εijc > 0], (8) 
where 1[.] is an indicator function equal to 1 if the statement in brackets is true, i indexes 
firms, Gen is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm owns a generator and 0 otherwise, the θ’s 
are fixed effects for industries (j), countries (c), and years (t), δijc is a measure of the number 
of power outages facing the firm, Fijc is a measure of financial constraint facing the firm, and 
Xijc is a vector of firm-level controls.  
The quadratic term is meant to capture in a very generic fashion the non-linear effects of 
power outages, and we expect ʱ1 > 0 and ʱ2 < 0, i.e., the probability of owning a generator is 
increasing in the prevalence of outages but above a given threshold (corresponding to δ0 in 
the model), their effect vanishes. On the other hand, the interaction between outages and 
financial constraints allows us to test whether these indeed matter and whether they are felt 
more strongly when outages are very prevalent; in this case, we expect ʱ3 < 0 and ʱ4 < 0. 
The model also implies that the coefficients should differ according to the intrinsic 
sensitivity of different sectors to the quality of electric supply. An important question is how 
to define this last aspect. We define Si as a measure of electricity expenditure as a percentage 
of total cost. To simplify further the empirical test, we define S0 as a dummy variable equal to 
1 for sectors which rely importantly on electricity as an input and 0 otherwise. To mitigate potential worries linked to the fact that technology choice is to some extent 
endogenous, so that industries in environments with a lot of outages may substitute towards 
technologies  that  use  less  electricity,  the  sector-level  benchmark  value  is  defined  taking 
reference values from countries with relatively low electricity constraints.
13 The underlying 
logic is to have a reference value of what technological choices would look like in a 
distortion-free environment, akin to a sector technological frontier. We do not need to assume 
that technological choices will be the same in the presence of electricity deficiencies, but 
rather that in sectors in which the first-best technology would be very electricity intensive the 
impact of deficiencies will be stronger and  will penalize firms more heavily, as those not 
owning  generators  will  have  to  settle  for  second -best  technologies  implying  a  larger 
efficiency gap. We discuss the technical details of the variable construction further in the next 
section. 
Equipped with this measure of ―benchmark electricity intensity‖, we can then test (8) on 
the two subsamples corresponding respectively to S0 = 0 and S0 =1. From the model, we 
expect the cutoff level, above which the effect of outages vanishes, to be lower in the second 
subsample, and similarly for the cutoff above which financial constraints bite harder. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
In order to estimate the specification above, we need to construct the parameter S0. The 
countries in our sample which have the smallest number of power outages are Indonesia, 
Lithuania, Brazil, Poland and Thailand.  Within this subsample, we compute the average cost 
of electricity as a percentage of total cost by industrial sector, as shown in Table 6.
14  We 
classify as ―very reliant on electricity‖ (S0=1) the industrial sectors that are above the median 
(7.65 percent), and the rest as sectors not relying too much on electricity (S0=0). Since all 
industrial sectors are not represented in our subsample of five countries with reliable  
                                                           
13 This is standard practice in the empirical literature. Examples of industry-level reference values for innovation 
or barriers to entry can be found for example in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) 
and Sharma (2007). 
14 A more satisfactory method would have been to use as a reference the average cost of electricity as a share of 
total cost by industrial sector for some industrialized country.  However, such data does not appear to be readily 
available. 
  
Table 6:  Reliance on electricity in countries with reliable service, by industrial sector 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR  Cost of Electricity (% 
of total cost) 
Number of firms having  
non zero electricity cost 
Other services  2,21  1 
Metals and machinery  3,50  352 
Leather  4,07  161 
Garments  4,44  759 
Auto and auto components  5,61  280 
Agroindustry  5,70  17 
Electronics  5,94  266 
Non-metallic and plastic materials  6,30  234 
Wood and furniture  6,93  495 
Construction  7,58  18 
Other unclassified  7,72  8 
Food  8,59  474 
Transport  11,08  11 
Chemicals and pharmaceutics  11,47  153 
Textiles  11,89  510 
Paper  12,40  28 
Retail and wholesale trade  13,31  2 
Other transport equipment  21,86  18 
Real estate and rental services  24,49  1 
Beverages  30,49  16 
Overall Total  7,07  3804 
Note: The countries with the least number of power outages in our sample are Lithuania, Thailand, Poland, Indonesia and Brazil. 
 
Table 7:  Firm sub-samples according to S0 
   S0    
By firms size  0  1  TOTAL 
Large (100 and over)         
Number of firms  8873  6211  15084 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint  19,81%  18,72%  19,34% 
Average Number of power outage  29,96  27,35  28,79 
% of firms with a generator  40,11%  57,03%  46,43% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost)  4,77  7,22  5,76 
Medium (20-99)         
Number of firms  11628  9869  21497 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint  15,39%  15,27%  15,34% 
Average Number of power outage  21,65  25,33  23,40 
% of firms with a generator  24,86%  35,23%  29,17% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost)  5,85  8,95  7,16 
Small (<20)         
Number of firms  13326  15021  28347 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint  13,15%  9,50%  11,21% 
Average Number of power outage  18,92  20,13  19,60 
% of firms with a generator  16,55%  18,97%  17,49% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost)  6,85  9,05  7,70 
Entire Sample         
Number of firms  33827  31101  64928 
% of firms quoting Electricity as a major or severe constraint  15,57%  13,16%  14,39% 
Average Number of power outage  22,71  23,18  22,95 
% of firms with a generator  26,19%  35,21%  29,74% 
Average Cost of Electricity (% of total cost)  5,82  8,44  6,88 electricity services, we assign a value for S0 in eight missing industrial sectors following 
intuitive criteria.
15 Table 7 presents some summary statistics on these two subsamples of 
firms. 
One standard worry with firm surveys is the potential non-response bias, as some firms 
may not respond to specific questions.  Overall, non-response is more frequent among small 
and service firms, and this is also the case when looking at missing data on generator 
ownership. This is a standard observation in firm surveys, the main reasons including lack of 
time and/or information by the  respondant—a situation more likely to occur in small firms. 
Because of the way generator ownership is distributed among firm size categories, this may 
affect our estimates, even if these non-responses are not driven by strategic considerations at 
the firm-level. While we have no systematic way to address this problem, results not shown 
here to save space indicate that most of our conclusions below are robust to excluding small 
firms and all service activities respectively.
16 
The results from estimating equation (8) are shown in Table 8. All specifications include 
country, industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the country -
industry level. We introduce in columns 1 and 2 the number of power outages and its square. 
Column 1 reports the results with only fixed effects, while column 2 introduces firm -level 
controls (age of firm, location, whether it exports or not, whether it has foreign capital or not, 
and size). To the extent that more power outages are likely to lead to more generator 
ownership, we expect the coefficient for the number of outages to be positive, and this is 
indeed what we obtain. The square value of the number of outages should  be negative to 
match the concavity stressed in the theoretical model, and indeed we find that its coefficients 
are negative and significant in both columns. The threshold values indicated below mean that 
                                                           
15 A ―core‖ set of sectors is systematically included in all country surveys so that the missing ones represent 
relatively few firms overall. (See Dethier, Hirn and Straub 2010, for a detailed description of the surveys). We 
consider Sports Goods, Other manufacturing, and Mining and quarrying as industrial sectors that do not rely 
heavily on electricity (the cost share of electricity in these sectors is less than 3.5 percent in the full sample of 
countries) and assign to these sectors, as well as to Accounting and finance and Advertising and marketing a 
value of S0=0.  Symmetrically, we assign a value S0=1 for firms operating in IT services, Hotels and restaurant, 
and telecommunications (average cost share of electricity above 8.6 percent in the full sample for the first two).  
 
16  A more general issue is the fact that surveys cannot provide information on firms that were not born, because 
of credit constraints or unreliable public power supply.  Dethier, Hirn and Straub (2010) address this ―camels 
and hippos‖ self-selection issue in details, stressing in particular that econometric models like the one in this 
paper only provide information about the effect of constraints on the sample of existing firms, and that the 
analysis of entry would require different models. Note however, as pointed out there, that self-selection is hardly 
ever likely to be complete, so some informative variation should remain in the data. in the full sample, power outages cease to have an effect on decisions to invest in generators 
(our δ0 measure in the model), when they exceed 12 per year. 
In columns 3 and 4, we introduce credit constraints, using as proxy a dummy variable 
indicating if firms quote access to finance as a major or severe constraint. While the findings 
of columns 1 and 2 are robust to this inclusion, we also find that both credit constraints alone 
and their interaction with power outages are significant and decrease firms’ probability of 
having invested in complementary capital. In terms of marginal effects, an increase of 1% in 
the share of financially constrained firms in implies a 0.05% reduction in the probability to 
have a generator, while facing 10 additional outages per year increases this marginal effect by 
6% (since 0.029/100*10/0.048 = 0.060). 
Note  finally  that,  in  columns  2  and  4,  the  coefficients  of  the  age,  capital  city,  and 
particularly export and foreign ownership dummies are large, positive and significant, while 
their inclusion actually reinforces the effects of power outages and credit constraints.  
Table 8: Complementary Capital Decision 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Probit  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator 
Number of Power Outage (/100)  0.120  0.172  0.146  0.206 
   (3.39)***  (5.10)***  (4.16)***  (6.70)*** 
Number of Power Outage (/100) Square  -0.002  -0.006  -0.002  -0.007 
   (2.74)***  (3.62)***  (3.31)***  (4.61)*** 
Access to Credit is Major/Severe Constraint (dummy)        -0.193  -0.136 
         (6.46)***  (4.16)*** 
Access to Credit is Major/Severe Constraint (dummy) *         -0.064  -0.082 
Number of Power Outage (/100)        (3.13)***  (2.90)*** 
Age     0.005     0.005 
      (3.84)***     (3.67)*** 
Capital City dummy     0.106     0.116 
      (2.06)**     (2.24)** 
Export dummy     0.372     0.368 
      (7.86)***     (7.70)*** 
Foreign dummy     0.216     0.212 
      (4.92)***     (4.77)*** 
Constant  -0.313  -0.717  -0.336  -0.155 
   (1.41)  (2.63)***  (1.54)  (0.56) 
Firm Size dummies     Yes     Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  24 943  18 786  23 953  18 017 
Threshold value  ʴ= -ʱ1/2ʱ2  22.00  15.25  26.50  12.17 
    Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Next,  in  Table  9,  we  present  the  same  specifications  as  in  Table  8  but  on  the  two 
subsamples corresponding respectively to S0=0 (columns 1 to 4) and S0=1 (columns 5 to 8). 
As we can see, while there are no major qualitative differences between the results obtained 
in the two subsamples, the size of the coefficients vary. 
 
Table 9: Complementary Capital Decision depending on Sector Reliance on Electricity 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  S0=0  S0=0  S0=0  S0=0  S0=1  S0=1  S0=1  S0=1 
Probit  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator 
Number of Power Outage (/100)  0.103  0.165  0.129  0.200  0.194  0.281  0.207  0.283 
   (2.68)***  (4.04)***  (3.48)***  (5.83)***  (4.61)***  (4.40)***  (3.91)***  (4.18)*** 
Number of Power Outage (/100) Square  -0.001  -0.006  -0.002  -0.007  -0.007  -0.030  -0.008  -0.030 
   (2.16)**  (3.10)***  (2.74)***  (4.22)***  (2.90)***  (3.45)***  (2.82)***  (3.14)*** 
Access to Credit is Major/Severe 
Constraint (dummy) 








         (6.13)***  (3.19)***        (4.73)***  (4.99)*** 
Access to Credit is Major/Severe 
Constraint (dummy) *  








Number of Power Outage (/100)        (4.13)***  (3.08)***        (0.34)  (0.27) 
Age     0.005     0.005     0.006     0.006 
      (3.87)***     (3.63)***     (4.42)***     (4.26)*** 
Capital City dummy     0.141     0.147     0.061     0.073 
      (2.05)**     (2.13)**     (0.73)     (0.85) 
Export dummy     0.440     0.435     0.226     0.232 
      (6.74)***     (6.54)***     (3.23)***     (3.35)*** 
Foreign dummy     0.178     0.173     0.278     0.263 
      (3.39)***     (3.22)***     (3.82)***     (3.47)*** 
Constant  -1.439  -1.372  -0.770  -0.950  -0.630  -0.330  -0.846  -0.181 
   (5.59)***  (4.13)***  (3.29)***  (3.02)***  (3.49)***  (0.74)  (1.51)  (0.40) 
Firm Size dummies     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  13 907  10 511  13 327  10 072  10 544  7 806  10 134  7 476 
Threshold value ʴ= -ʱ1/2ʱ2  17,50  13,00  22,00  16,00  12,50  4,91  13,33  4,95 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The main model’s prediction is that the cutoff level—above which the effect of outages 
vanishes—should  be  lower  in  the  subsample  of  electricity-intensive  sectors  (S0=1).  The 
threshold levels computed with the marginal values of ʱ1 and ʱ2 are indicated at the bottom of 
Table 10.  As expected, they are always lower when firms operate: while power outages 
effect  on  the  probability  to  have  a  generator  becomes  negative  above  16  cuts  per  year 
(column 4) in non-electricity intensive sectors, this threshold is reduced to 5 (column 8) in 
sectors relying heavily  on electricity. As mentioned above, this  means  that,  in  this  latter group, when outages frequency exceeds this relatively low threshold, small firms are virtually 
unable to operate and the sectors are populated only by large firms owning generators. 
Finally, we explore the relevance of the results from corollary 1 above, by estimating 
equation (8) on different firm size subsamples (respectively small, medium and large firms). 
We  report  the  results  in  Table  10.  First,  note  that  the  number  of  power  outage  always 
significantly increases the probability that small, medium or large firms own complementary 
capital, although the effect is larger for medium firms. Second, the quadratic term is not 
significant when considering small firms only, highlighting the fact that the non-linear effect 
of outages is mostly relevant for medium and, to a lesser extent, large firms. Overall, this 
confirms our theoretical insight that variations in power outages affect mostly medium-size 
firms. 
 
Table 10: Complementary Capital Decision and Firm Size 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Probit  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator  Generator 
   Small Firms Sample  Medium Firms Sample  Large Firms Sample 
Number of Power Outage  (/100)  0.243  0.270  0.387  0.389  0.236  0.207 
   (1.90)*  (1.84)*  (4.26)***  (3.78)***  (3.53)***  (3.15)*** 
Number of Power Outage (/100) Square  -0.037  -0.046  -0.068  -0.067  -0.024  -0.023 
   (1.02)  (1.14)  (2.79)***  (2.62)***  (3.42)***  (3.49)*** 
Access to Credit is Major/Severe Constraint (dummy)  -0.078  -0.119  -0.099  -0.121  -0.127  -0.159 
   (1.22)  (1.77)*  (2.08)**  (2.12)**  (2.13)**  (2.34)** 
Access to Credit is Major/Severe Constraint (dummy) *   -0.011  -0.003  -0.035  -0.021  -0.024  -0.009 
Number of Power Outage  (/100)  (0.16)  (0.04)  (0.76)  (0.46)  (0.43)  (0.16) 
Age     0.005     0.004     0.003 
      (2.61)***     (2.30)**     (2.68)*** 
Capital City dummy     -0.022     0.188     0.147 
      (0.30)     (2.39)**     (1.51) 
Export dummy     0.267     0.280     0.258 
      (2.80)***     (4.54)***     (4.30)*** 
Foreign dummy     0.426     0.142     0.243 
      (4.26)***     (2.06)**     (3.69)*** 
Constant  -0.453  -0.365  -0.473  -0.939  -1.286  -1.846 
   (1.15)  (0.64)  (1.13)  (2.99)***  (2.17)**  (3.15)*** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  6 056  4 375  7 318  5 178  5 317  4 079 
Threshold value ʴ= -ʱ1/2ʱ2    3.44  2.95  2.81  2.83  4.70  4.61 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The results of our empirical exercise can be summarized in an intuitive way as follows. 
For sectors that are very reliant on electricity, such as the chemical or textile industries, a 
high prevalence of outages affects returns to investment so badly that small firms that lack 
enough initial  assets  to  invest  in  an electric  generator end up being squeezed out  of the 
financial market and unable to borrow to expand production. In these sectors, the probability 
that firms invest in a generator depends mostly on their level of initial assets and is not 
affected by the prevalence of outages though it is strongly limited by the degree of financial 
constraints  they  face.  In  these  sectors,  we  should  see  a  number  of  large  firms  with 
investments in complementary capital (power generator) and no (or few) small formal firms. 
The policy implication hence seems to be that the priority to improve performance in 
sectors  that  naturally  rely  heavily  on  electricity  is  to  relax  financial  constraints  before 
addressing physical ones, because firms active in these sectors will have to invest in own 
generating capacity in order to avoid costly production interruptions and their ability to do so 
depends primarily on their access to the credit market. On the other hand, as long as full 
reliability (or close to it) is not obtained, marginal improvements in the quality of electric 
supply will have little effect since they would be insufficient to spur the entry of small firms 
to the market, while leaving large firms unaffected. 
It  is  in  sectors  in  which  the  first-best  technology  is  very  reliant  on  electricity  that 
deficient supply will induce the biggest distortions. Firms there face the choice of investing in 
costly generators or settling for second-best technologies which imply large efficiency gaps. 
Targeting these sectors with policies easing the access to credit—for example through the 
provision of credit guarantees for firms investing in electric generators—might have large 
payoffs if it allows for sector-wide technological adjustments towards the efficiency frontier. 
In contrast, for sectors that are less reliant on electricity, the probability to invest in a 
generator is positively affected by the prevalence of power outages, and it is again affected by 
financial constraints, though less strongly than before. We should see, in addition to a number 
of large firms with investments in complementary capital, a range of small firms that manage 
to access the credit market and produce formally, despite not having invested in a generator, and whose technology is closer to the frontier. For these firms, improvements in electric 
supply are likely to have significant positive payoffs. 
Both set of implications could theoretically be addressed by a policy mix to relax credit 
constraints to large firms willing to invest in electricity generator (specific public loans or 
guarantees, for example) while allowing for the resale of this electricity to small firms around 
them.
17  However reselling electricity to the grid is not a generalized practice by enterprises 
in developing countries.  It requires a legislative and/or regulatory enabling framework and, 
more  importantly,  economic  incentives  for  the  utility  and  the  firm s,  which  is  not 
automatically the case.
18  Liberalizing the power market and allowing trade electricity among 
firms actually reflects coping strategies that many small firms in developing countries would 
like to adopt. While co-generation (for example, from bagasse by sugar producers) is easier to 
accommodate  because  it  has  a  zero  marginal  cost,  it  usually  involves  considerable 
negotiations  because  of  its  seasonality  and  its  uncertainty  in  terms  of  volume.  Another 
consideration—highlighting the difficulty of such arrangements—relates to the reason for 
which firms purchase their generators in the first place. They are either large firms that want 
to be independent from the grid for economic or security reasons (e.g., refineries or mining 
companies) and therefore do not have much incentives selling little volume to the grid, or 
small/medium enterprises which need stand-by generators in case of outages or to ensure 
high reliability of power supply.  
If reselling electricity to the grid is not feasible, a policy of charging different electricity 
prices for large and small firms is a possibility. As mentioned earlier, there are important 
scale economies in own power generation so that smaller firms would be willing to pay more 
for publicly provided power than larger firms. Instead of giving quantity discounts, public 
monopolies should charge larger firms more and smaller firms less than they presently do.  
As pointed out by Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray (1996), in countries where large firms have 
excess capacity like Nigeria, they could make intensive use of their idle power generating 
capacity, while in countries where firms are expanding like Indonesia, they would enlarge 
                                                           
17 See the discussion in Lee, Anas and Oh 1996 and in Lee, Anas, Verma and Murray 1996. 
18  Most enterprise-owned generators run on diesel and their marginal cost is much higher than  that of large 
public utilities using fossil fuel-fired power plants, even when there are large line losses.  
 
 
 their facilities. In both types of countries, small users would realize savings by having to rely 
less  on  expensive  power  generators.  The  evidence  uncovered  in  this  paper  adds  to  the 
rationale of such an approach.  However a policy of charging higher tariffs to large industries 
than to small industries to fully take advantage of the idle capacity of captive power plants in 
large industries has additional implications which need to be considered.  In particular, the 
cost of supplying electricity to large firms is generally lower than to small firms given the 
higher  voltage  level  (implying  less  transmission  investments)  and  the  larger  electricity 
volumes  supplied.  Furthermore,  as  electricity  provided  by  a  network  system  cannot  be 
provided  at  different  service  quality  levels  to  individual  customers,
19  the benefit of the 
proposed pricing policy could take a long time to tr anslate into tangible benefits in terms of 
improved supply quality for small industries. 
 
Finally, the discussion raises another important issue regarding the environmental impact 
of different policies.  Rather than proposing a general relaxation of financial const raints, it 
might be more appropriate to shadow price carbon and seek special incentives for renewable 
energy and/or energy efficiency.
20  Admittedly, it is unrealistic at today’s level of technology 
to achieve good power supply reliability through renewables only.  However, the carbon 
incentive could at least produce benefits in terms of energy consumption and fuel inputs. 
 
 
                                                           
19   Some  exceptions  might  apply  to  customers  belonging  to  different  network  ―nodes‖  but  it  would  be  a 
geographical separation that rarely, if ever, coincides with the size of the industry or the consumers served. 
20   We are grateful to Lucio Monari for mentioning this point to us.  REFERENCES 
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